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THE MORTGAGEE REMEDIES OF 
ENTRY INTO POSSESSION AND 
RECEIVERSHIP: ANCIENT EQUITY 
MEETS MODERN STATUTE 
Daniel Armstrong* 
This article comprehensively catalogues and critiques the differences between the mortgagee 
remedies of entry into possession and receivership.  In particular, the article looks at differences in 
how rights, duties, powers and liabilities of a mortgagor in possession as opposed to a receiver affect 
the choice of remedy.  The author concludes that recent changes to the law in New Zealand have 
undermined the traditional advantages of receivership, and that equity is currently re-emphasising 
the rights of mortgagors. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Following the abolishment of foreclosure in New Zealand,1 mortgagees of land usually 
enforce their security through sale. The remedies of possession and receivership also allow 
mortgagees to recover loan proceeds through the interception of rents and profits from the 
mortgage property. These two remedies are similar, yet the applicable laws are generally 
treated separately. Furthermore, the institutionalised mantra that receivership is the better 
remedy has arguably led to receivership law being valued while the archaic laws of 
mortgagee possession are comparatively disregarded. This article seeks to re-evaluate that 
inherited wisdom by contrasting and comparing various aspects of mortgagee possession 
and receivership law with the practical goal of providing information pertinent to a 
mortgagee's choice of remedy. The recent changes to these bodies of law are also placed in 
their historical context by analysing how they perpetuate equity's centuries-old oscillation 
between championing the rights of mortgagees and mortgagors.  
  
*  This paper was submitted in fulfilment of the LLB (Hons) requirements at Victoria University in 
1999. 
1 Conveyancing Ordinance 1842 (UK), cl 41. Today, see the Property Law Act 1952, s 89 (PLA 1952). 
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This article only deals with "charge mortgages", under which mortgagees acquire no 
estate,2 and with receivers appointed by the mortgagee3 as the mortgagor's agent4 to hold 
powers of management.5   
II A BRIEF HISTORY 
The laws of mortgagee possession and receivership developed through equity's 
struggle to balance the rights of mortgagees and mortgagors. Ironically many equitable 
rules themselves became the source of inequity, and as later Chancery Courts sought to 
avoid, rather than remove, these entrenched rules, the balance tilted back and forth.  
Under common law mortgagees, as legal title-holders, could take possession of 
mortgaged land immediately,6 without notice,7 and without default by the mortgagor.8 
Despite the potential for injustice, the Chancery Courts would, "… never interfere to 
prevent the mortgagee from taking possession."9 This hesitancy unexplained, equity 
instead evolved the solution of holding mortgagees in possession to high standards of 
behaviour, requiring them to answer not only for the land's actual income, but also for 
what might have been obtained but for their wilful default.10 This equitable rule was 
universally characterised as "onerous" and so equity, ameliorating its own rule, came to 
  
2  Only charge mortgages may be registered. The PLA 1952, s 100 states that registered mortgages 
shall "have effect as security, but shall not operate as a transfer of the estate or interest charged." 
The Second Schedule contains several forms for a registered mortgage, all of which operate by 
way of charge. 
3  As opposed to court-appointed receivers. See Judicature Act 1908, s 16; Evans v Orr [1923] NZLR 
769 (SC); Securities Act 1978, s 49(3)(f) (relevant to the application of a trustee or statutory 
supervisor). The court will only appoint receivers as a last resort: Steel v Mataoki International Ltd 
(1988) 4 NZCLC 64,710 (HC). 
4  In New Zealand it is statutorily presumed that receivers are appointed as agent of the mortgagor, 
not the mortgagee. See Receiverships Act 1993, s 6(3) (RA 1993), reversing the presumption under 
the general law.  
5  Distinguishing them from receivers simpliciter, who only receive and distribute income. See Re 
Manchester and Milford Railway Company (1880) 14 Ch D 645, 653 per Jessel MR (CA).  
6  Possession could be taken "before the ink is dry on the mortgage": Four Maids Ltd v Dudley 
Marshall (Properties) Ltd [1957] 1 Ch 317, 320, per Harman J. See also Birch v Wright (1786) 1 TR 378, 
383 per Buller J. 
7  Doe d Fisher v Giles (1829) 5 Bing 421.  
8  Doe d Roylance v Lightfoot (1841) 8 M&W 553; Green v Burns (1879) 6 L R Ir 173.  
9  Marquis of Cholmondeley v Lord Clinton (1817) 2 Mer 171, 359 per Sir William Grant; London 
Permanent Benefit Building Society v De Baer [1968] 1 All ER 372.  
10  See below subsection VI D: A Mortgagee's Duty Upon Entering Into Possession.  
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favour devices, including receivership, which allowed mortgagees to gain the benefits of 
possession while avoiding this liability.11 
Most recently, major statutory activity occurred in this area in 1993 when the 
Receiverships Act 1993 (RA 1993) and a new Part VIIA of the Property Law Act 1952 
(PLA), concerning mortgagee possession, emerged from the Companies (Ancillary 
Provisions) Bill. 
This article now embarks upon the task of cataloguing and critiquing the differences 
between the mortgagee remedies of possession and receivership. Attention first falls on the 
initiation stage, where despite the recent coterminous review of the applicable statutes, 
unjustifiable and technical differences between the remedies remain.  
III INITIATING POSSESSION AND RECEIVERSHIP 
A When Does the Entitlement Arise? 
The first reference point is the mortgage contract, which can specify exactly when 
possession and receivership may be exercised. However, in the absence of such words 
possession is permitted only, "upon default in payment…".12  This reflects the equitable 
stance that securing repayment is a mortgage's ultimate purpose;13 it underlies the 
mortgagor's equitable right of redemption,14 and is justifiably emphasised in this context. 
Strangely, considering equity's traditional preference for devices which allow mortgagees 
to avoid the remedy of possession, the receivership remedy is not automatically available 
upon default in repayment,15 and an amendment to correct this discrepancy would appear 
justified.16 
  
11  See generally Gaskell v Gosling [1896] 1 QB 669, 691-693 per Rigby LJ (CA). 
12  Land Transfer Act 1952, s 106 (LTA 1952). Compare the Property Law Act 1925 (UK), ss 95(4), 
87(1), which simply grants mortgagees the full common law right of possession. 
13  See Downsview Nominees Ltd v First City Corporation [1993] 1 NZLR 512, 522 per Lord Templeman 
(PC). 
14  Whereby equity allows a mortgagor to repay the loan at any time, regardless of a contractual time 
limit. See PLA 1952, s 81. 
15  Compare, for example, Law of Property Act 1925 (UK), s101; New South Wales (Conveyancing) 
Act 1919 (NSW), s 109(1)(c). 
16  See New Zealand Law Commission (Kenneth Keith) "A New Property Law Act" (Law 
Commission, Wellington, 1994) Report No 29, Draft Property Law Act, Fourth Schedule cl 10, 220 
["NZLC R29"].  
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The premature exercise of an entitlement can render the mortgagee or receiver liable 
for trespass,17 conversion, or breach of contract.18 The High Court can investigate the 
validity of a receiver's appointment19 and may restrain by injunction a premature entry 
into possession.  
B A Mortgagee's Duty When Choosing Whether to Exercise an Entitlement 
If a mortgage ranks equally with other securities, the mortgagee may owe a fiduciary 
duty to exercise their remedies in the security-holders' collective best interests.20 
Otherwise the decision is restrained only by the need to act in good faith and without 
oppression (see below section VI: Duties),21 a duty possibly breached if they appoint an 
incompetent receiver.22  
C Notice Requirements  
A mortgagee cannot enter into possession until they serve the mortgagor with notice 
under section 92 of the PLA notifying them of the default and their right to remedy it.23 
Belying the section's importance, it cannot be contractually avoided.24 Yet section 92 can be 
ignored when appointing a receiver25 even though such appointment may have drastic 
consequences, triggering default provisions in the mortgagor's other credit contracts or 
raising the presumption that a corporate mortgagor cannot pay its debts.26 
  
17  See R Jaffe Ltd v Jaffe (No 2) [1932] NZLR 195 (SC). 
18  See ANZ Banking Group (NZ) Ltd v Gibson [1986] 1 NZLR 556, 560 per Richardson J (CA).  
19  RA 1993, s 34(2)(c). 
20  Re Maskelyne British Typewriter Ltd [1988] 1 Ch 133 (CA); Re Slogger Automatic Feeder Co Ltd [1915] 1 
Ch 478 (both relating to the appointment of receivers). 
21  Quennell v Maltby [1979] 1 All ER 568, 571 per Denning MR (regarding entry into possession); 
Shamji v Johnson Matthey Bankers Ltd [1986] BCLC 278, 284 per Hoffmann J; Terry Clark & Associates 
Pty Ltd v Carez Nominees Pty Ltd (1994) 13 ACSR 314 (SA:SC) (regarding the appointment of a 
receiver). See generally Trent Petherick "Can a Mortgagee Simply Decide If and When to Sell?" 
[1996] NZLJ 173.  
22  Shamji v Johnson Matthey Bankers Ltd [1986] BCLC 278, 283 per Hoffmann J. 
23  See Jaffe v Premier Motors Ltd [1960] NZLR 146, 148 per Shorland J (SC). 
24  PLA 1952, s 92(7). 
25  RA 1993, s 9. 
26  Companies Act 1993, s 287(c). This is one of the pre-requisites to liquidation: Companies Act 1993, 
s 241(4). 
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Swift appointment makes sense when a receiver is appointed by a debenture-holder27 
holding a floating charge over a company's entire assets. In this context, the secured assets, 
such as trading stock, can be moved outside the ambit of the floating charge by ordinary 
sale, and so the law allows receivers to move in after a "reasonable time" (which can be 
brief).28 But when the security is a fixed, registered charge-mortgage over land, the need 
for swift appointment diminishes. The mortgagee's fixed, registered interest is not lost if 
the land is sold, and land is less readily damaged or "lost" than other property.  
Regrettably the Receiverships Act 1993 applies to all receiverships regardless of the 
property and security involved.29 The PLA avoids this mistake by requiring section 92 
notice only when possession is claimed over land; section 9 of the Receiverships Act 1993 
should draw the same distinction.30 
D Methods of Execution 
Mortgagees can take possession by obtaining a court order,31 by receiving the land's 
rents or profits,32 or by physically entering the premises.33 Physical possession may attract 
criminal sanction if taken forcibly,34 but is still effective against the mortgagor.35 To 
acquire the full powers, duties and liabilities of mortgagees in possession they must 
  
27  Debenture-holders and debenture-grantors hold essentially the same positions as mortgagees and 
mortgagors: Downsview Nominees Ltd v First City Corporation [1993] 1 NZLR 513, 521 per Lord 
Templeman (PC). 
28  This rule is established in the case of on-demand debentures: Toms v Wilson (1863) 4 B&S 455. In 
the case of default on repayment, "reasonable time" only means time to complete the mechanics of 
payment; ANZ Banking Group (NZ) Ltd v Gibson [1986] 1 NZLR 556, 565 per Richardson J (CA); 
Bank of Baroda v Panessar [1986] 3 All ER 751, 760 per Walton J. See also William Conklin and Jodi 
Morrison "Public Issues in a Private Law World: The Appointment of a Receiver as a Case Study" 
(1988) 26 Osgoode Hall LJ 45, asserting that even the reasonable time rule does not prevent 
procedural and substantive injustice.  
29  An approach advocated by the New Zealand Law Commission (Sir Owen Woodhouse) "Company 
Law: Reform & Restatement" (Law Commission, Wellington, 1989) Report No 9, para 112, 27, para 
750, 380 ["NZLC R9"].  
30  See the suggestions in NZLC R29, above n 16, para 23, 8 and para 58, 18. 
31  For a review of the various proceedings available to a mortgagee see Peter Young Law of Mortgages 
of Land in New Zealand (1 ed, Wellington, Butterworths, 1995) para 22.37, 366-367.  
32  LTA 1952, s 106. For example, by instructing tenants to pay rent to a collector employed by the 
mortgagee. 
33  Lysnar v National Bank of New Zealand Ltd (No 2) [1936] NZLR 541 per Kennedy J (CA). 
34  Crimes Act 1961, s 91. 
35  Lows v Telford (1876) 1 App Cas 414 (HL). 
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actually take the management of the property out of the mortgagor's hands.36 This rule 
arose from equity's hesitancy to find that mortgagees had entered into possession, a 
further example of equity ameliorating the harsh consequences of other equitable rules.37 
Receivers are appointed when they receive written notice of their appointment and 
tacitly or expressly accept it.38  
E Personal Qualifications  
Australian receivers must belong to a recognised body of professional accountants, 
have a university degree, and be experienced at winding up companies.39 The New 
Zealand Law Commission supported similar positive requirements,40 but apparently, "no 
case was made out for such occupational regulation."41 Consequently New Zealand only 
applies negative criteria,42 disqualifying people for presumed bias,43 a history of financial 
mismanagement,44 presumed incompetence at managing property,45 or a proven 
unwillingness or inability to observe the statutory duties demanded of directors, receivers 
  
36  Noyes v Pollock (1886) 32 Ch D 53 (CA); Overden v Prins (1897) 16 NZLR 224 (CA). 
37  See above section II: A Brief History.  
38  RA 1993, s 6(2). Other methods can be specified, but they must be strictly conformed to: BNZ 
Finance Ltd v McKenna (1989) 4 NZCLC 65,327, 65,329-330 (HC); Wrights Hardware Pty Ltd v Evans 
(1988) 13 ACLR 631 (WA:SC). 
39  Peter Blanchard and Michael Gedye The Law of Company Receiverships in New Zealand and Australia 
(2 ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 1994) para 4.17, 84. 
40  NZLC R9, above n 29, Draft Property Law Amendment Act, cl 104AD(1), 394. 
41  (10 August 1993) 537, NZPD, 17330 per Hon D Graham (Minister of Justice). 
42  RA 1993, s 5(1). The High Court can waive these restrictions. 
43  This disqualifies the mortgagee, current or recent directors of the mortgagor or mortgagee, and 
people with a current or recent interest in shares of the mortgagor or mortgagee. 
44  This disqualifies undischarged bankrupts and discharged bankrupts prohibited by the High Court 
under the Insolvency Act 1967, s 111(1)(c) from directing or managing a company. 
45  This disqualifies people subject to compulsory treatment orders under the Mental Health 
(Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, people whose property is subject to a 
temporary Family Court protection order or temporary management order under the Protection 
of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988, ss 30 or 31, and people aged less than 18. 
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or liquidators.46 Trustee companies are the only corporate bodies that can act as 
receivers.47  
In comparison, only bankrupts are uniformly unable to enter into possession since their 
right to do so vests in their assignee.48 The other groups traditionally lacking contractual 
capacity (minors49 and the mentally-impaired) are not uniformly barred. Although a 
mentally-impaired mortgagee's property rights can be transferred to a property 
manager,50 at law the mortgage is enforceable against the mortgagor.51 Similarly under 
the Minors' Contracts Act 1969, a minor's mortgage, and thus the right to enter into 
possession, is prima facie enforceable against the mortgagor.52 So while certain 
incompetent, biased, and untrustworthy people are wisely prohibited from managing land 
as "receivers", the law generally permits them to exercise similar powers if they don the 
mask of "mortgagees in possession", either when taking possession under their own 
mortgages or as employees hired to manage property on behalf of another mortgagee.  
To correct this oversight, the list in section 5 of the Receiverships Act 1993 should be 
transplanted into the PLA, and the High Court should be empowered to ban people who 
repeatedly or seriously violate the duties of a mortgagee in possession from acting in that 
capacity.  
F How Might the Differences in Initiation Affect a Mortgagee's Choice of Remedy? 
A well-drafted mortgage will insulate a mortgagor's entitlement to possession and 
receivership from situation-specific facts. Nevertheless, a particular remedy may be 
impractical or impossible in a given situation. For instance, those holding mortgages 
personally or through closely-held companies could once appoint themselves as 
  
46  As evidenced by a prohibition on them holding these positions issued by the court under the RA 
1993, s 37(6), the Companies Act 1993, ss 286(5), 382, 383 or 385, or the repealed Companies Act 
1955, ss 188A, 189, 189A, 199K, 199L, or 199N. 
47  Trustee Companies Act 1967, s 7. The appointment of any other body corporate is a "nullity": 
Portman Building Society v Gallwey [1955] 1 All ER 227, 230 per Wynn-Parry J. 
48  Insolvency Act 1964, s 42(2)(b). 
49  Since 1 January 1971, a minor is someone aged less than twenty: Age of Majority Act 1970, s 4.  
50  See the Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988, by which the Family Court can 
appoint a manager over the property of anyone lacking the competence to manage their own 
affairs.  
51  Although possibly not against the mentally-impaired mortgagee. See, for example, O'Conner v 
Hart [1985] 1 NZLR 159 (PC); Imperial Loan Co v Stone [1892] 1 QB 599 (CA). 
52  See generally J Burrows, J Finn and S Todd Law of Contract in New Zealand (Butterworths, 
Wellington, 1997) para 13.1, 441-447.  
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receiver,53 but now must enter into possession instead.54 A lack of forethought or 
inexperienced drafting might lead to the omission of a receivership clause, thus excluding 
that remedy. In some cases, a mortgagee might suspect a disgruntled mortgagor will 
poison crops or commit arson, but will lack the evidence necessary to obtain the court's 
permission for early possession.55 By appointing a receiver they can immediately establish 
a presence on the land to discourage such acts. Another factor is the cost; receivership is 
cheaper as possession often requires a court order. 
IV SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS 
Once a remedy is initiated various statutory obligations regulate the information 
flowing to the mortgagors. Their importance is reflected in the fines of up to $10,000 levied 
upon their non-observance. These obligations' social value, plus the similar status of 
mortgagees in possession and receivers, suggests that they should be identically applied. 
Surprisingly, some are not. 
A Notice Obligations 
Both groups must give written notice of their possession or appointment to the 
mortgagor and public.56 The relevant registrar57 and Commissioner of Inland Revenue58 
may also require notification. 
Receivers alone must note their appointment on documents relating to the mortgaged 
property bearing the mortgagor's name.59 This informs third parties that the mortgagor is 
in financial difficulty, a sensible protection which should also be required of mortgagees in 
possession.  
  
53  An example is provided by Mr Russell, whose exploits led to litigation in Re Tricorp Investments 
Ltd (1988) 4 NZCLC 64, 620 (HC), Downsview  Nominees Ltd v First City Corporation [1993] 1 NZLR 
513 (PC), and Downsivew Nominees Ltd v Official Assignee (1994) 7 NZCLC 260, 605. 
54  Due to the RA 1993, ss 5(1)(b), 5(1)(c)(i), 5(1)(c)(ii), 5(1)(d(i), and 5(1)(d)(ii) . 
55  PLA 1952, s 92(5). 
56  PLA 1952, s 104DD(1); RA 1993, s 8(1). 
57  PLA 1952, s 104DD(3); RA 1993, s 8(3). The relevant registrar may be the Companies Registrar, 
Registrar of Industrial and Provident Societies, Registrar of Incorporated Societies or the Registrar 
of Friendly Societies and Credit Unions: RA 1993, s 2 "Registrar". 
58  Goods and Services Tax Act 1985, s 58(3). This is only if a taxable activity of the mortgagor is 
continued. 
59  RA 1993, s 10. 
 
 THE MORTGAGEE REMEDIES OF ENTRY INTO POSSESSION AND RECEIVERSHIP 675 
B Accounting Obligations  
Both groups must keep income of the mortgaged property separate60 and keep61 
accounting records that "correctly record and explain the receipts, expenditure, and other 
transactions relating to the [mortgaged] property".62 But as agents, receivers alone must 
observe the additional accounting standards imposed by general agency law.63  
C Reporting Obligations 
Within two months of possession or appointment, both groups must prepare a report 
summarising the property's state of affairs.64 Similar reports are made within the two 
months following every successive six month period.65  
Only receivers must separately calculate the amounts owed to preferential creditors.66 
More importantly, only receivers must give details of past sales in every report; a 
mortgagee in possession's first report need only detail proposals for future sales.67 This 
apparent drafting oversight should be amended to reduce the likelihood of litigation over 
mortgagee sales.68 
D Whistle-Blowing Obligations 
Both groups must notify the Companies Registrar of any suspected breaches by a 
corporate mortgagor's directors of the Companies Act 1955, Companies Act 1993, or 
Securities Act 1978.69 Only receivers must report further suspected offences against the 
Financial Reporting Act 1993 and Takeovers Act 1993.70 
  
60  PLA 1952, s 104HH; RA 1993, s 21.  
61  For at least six years after the termination of the possession or receivership: PLA 1952, s 104GG(2); 
RA 1993, s 22(2). 
62  PLA 1952, s 104GG(1); RA 1993, s 22(1).  
63  Smiths Ltd v Middleton [1979] 3 All ER 842 (receiver liable for not elaborating on statutorily 
required abstracts). 
64  PLA 1952, s 104II; RA 1993, s 23.  
65  PLA 1952, s 104JJ; RA 1993, s 24. 
66  RA 1993, s 23(2)(d). 
67  Compare PLA 1952, s 104II(2)(b) with RA 1993, s 23(2)(b). 
68  See NZLC R29, above n 16, Draft Property Law Act cl 134(4)(b), 115, which corrects this oversight. 
69  PLA 1952, s104NN; RA 1993, s 28. 
70  Inserted by the Receiverships Amendment Act 1994, s 4. 
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The law imposes upon receivers alone the related duty of ensuring that a corporate 
mortgagor does not commit offences, for instance by not paying taxes.71  
E How Do the Differences in Specific Obligations Impact the Choice of Remedy? 
The very existence of these obligations, which may require expertise and time to 
discharge and are accompanied by sizeable fines, provides mortgagees with limited time 
or accounting skills good reason for choosing receivership. A further advantage is that 
only receivers can petition the court to relieve them of the need to comply with an 
obligation.72 
This section has discussed tasks that must be performed. The next section investigates 
the powers that mortgagees in possession can opt to exercise. 
V RIGHTS AND POWERS  
A Sources 
The default powers of mortgagees in possession and receivers come from statute and 
the general law, but can be altered by the mortgage contract itself.73 Additional powers 
arise from the principle that, "when an express authority is given, there is an implied 
authority … to do all acts which may be necessary for the purpose of effecting the object 
for which the express authority is given."74 The principle most usefully combines with a  
receiver's open-ended power to "manage the property in receivership".75  
Rights and powers can be categorised according to whether their existence makes 
possession or receivership the more attractive option.  
  
71  Re John Willmet (Ashford) Ltd [1979] 2 All ER 615, where a receiver was required to pay the 
mortgagor company's value-added tax. 
72  RA 1993, s 37(4)(a). 
73  RA 1993, s 14(2). 
74  Pole v Leask (1860) 28 Beav 562, 575 per Sir John Romilly. Note that the principle seemed limited to 
extending "express authorities" given orally, but later cases did not draw this distinction. See also 
Inglis Electrics Pty Ltd v Healing (Sales) Pty Ltd [1965] NSWR 1652, 1656 per Asprey J (NSW:SC); 
Australian Boot Trade Employees' Federation v Whybrow & Co (1910) 11 CLR 311, 337 per Isaacs J 
(HCA). 
75 RA 1993, s 14(2)(c). For instance, this express power conveys an implied power to "hive-down": 
Blanchard and Gedye, above n 39, para 10.07, 232. 
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B Rights and Powers Which Should not Affect a Mortgagee's Choice of Remedy  
1 List of shared powers 
In relation to existing leases, mortgagees in possession stand, "as though the reversion 
of the land were for the time being vested at law in the mortgagee"76 and receivers are 
empowered to "demand and recover, by action or otherwise, income of the property in 
receivership."77 Thus both groups may demand rent, distrain against a non-residential78 
tenant's possessions,79 or sue a tenant's guarantors. They can also grant new tenancies, 
although a mortgagee in possession is limited to granting leases of seven years or less.80 
Both groups can collect income by logging trees81 or harvesting crops,82 although 
mortgagees in possession can claim only those crops harvested after possession was 
taken.83 There is no power to embark on risky ventures.84  
Both groups may adopt the mortgagor's existing contracts. Adoption in this sense 
requires more than acquiescence: "a novation or renegotiation is required.85 If not 
adopted, the contract remains in force between the mortgagor and third party unless 
repudiated.86  
Receivers can enter new contracts concerning the mortgaged property if, "necessary or 
incidental to the exercise of [their other] powers".87 They can also use a company 
  
76  PLA 1952, s 91(11). 
77  RA 1993, s 14(2)(a). 
78  Note PLA 1952, s 107A(a): "No person shall be entitled to distrain for any rent due under any lease 
of a dwellinghouse." 
79  LTA 1952, s 107. Provided the rent is twenty-one days late and seven further days have passed 
since payment was requested. See further the Distress and Replevin Act 1908. 
80  PLA 1952, s 91(1). 
81  PLA 1952, s 95. 
82  See Corbett v Agnew [1930] NZLR 1033 (SC); Bagnall v Villar (1879) 12 Ch D 812. 
83  Re Phillips (1880) 16 Ch D 104 (CA). 
84  Hughes v Williams (1806) 12 Ves Jun 494, where a mortgagee in possession could not claim from 
the mortgagor the costs of opening a slate quarry. 
85  The Laws of New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington, 1996), vol 22, Receivers, para 1, 3 ["LNZ 
Receivers"], para 43, 50. See also Greenwood v Martins Bank Ltd [1933] AC 51, 57 per Lord Tomlin 
(HL), stating that in contract, "adoption requires valuable consideration"; Re Diesels & Components 
Pty Ltd (1985) 2 Qd R 456, 459 per McPherson J. 
86  See below subsection V C 2: Power to Repudiate Existing Contracts. 
87  RA 1993, s 13(1). 
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mortgagor's seal88 and their power of management implies a right to borrow and grant 
security in the mortgagor's name.89 A mortgagee in possession's freedom of contract 
means they too can enter such contracts in their own name. 
Importantly, both groups can enter self-interested transactions. Keech v Sandford90 
states that fiduciaries cannot use their position for self-profit,91 but mortgagees are not 
trustees.92 A good illustration is White v City of London Brewery,93 where a mortgagee in 
possession leased the mortgaged pub subject to the purchaser agreeing to buy beer 
exclusively from the mortgagee, who was a brewer. The resulting profits were held to 
belong to the mortgagee's business, not to the mortgagor's hereditaments, and so the 
mortgagee could keep them.94 The mortgagor could only recover the extra rent that would 
have been made had the property been let without the restrictive covenant. 
Additionally, mortgagees can sell mortgaged property to relatives or companies in 
which they have an interest provided they act in good faith and take reasonable care to get 
a proper price.95 They cannot, however, sell to themselves.96 
Receivers, despite their "agent" status, do not owe a full range of fiduciary duties97 and  
can also enter self-interested transactions provided they observe their duties, fully disclose 
their interest, and obtain the mortgagor's informed consent.98  
  
88  RA 1993, s 13(4). Only companies registered under the Companies Act 1955 must stamp their 
deeds with their company seal: Companies Act 1993, s 180(1A). 
89  This is especially so when the mortgagor is a company, since receivers inherit the directors' 
implied duty to borrow and grant security: General Auction Estate and Monetary Company v Smith 
[1891] 3 Ch 432; Re Patent File Company (1870) 6 Ch App 83.  
90  Keech v Sandford (1726) 2 Eq Cas Abr 741.  
91  See also Boardman v Phipps [1966] 3 All ER 721 (HL) per Lords Cohen, Hodson and Guest (Lord 
Upjohn and Viscound Dilhorne dissenting), extending this to information gained as trustee. 
92  Nash v Eads (1880) 25 Sol J 95; Warner v Jacob (1882) 20 Ch D 220; Matai Industries Ltd v Jensen [1989] 
1 NZLR 525 (HC).  
93  White v City of London Brewery Co (1889) 42 ChD 237. 
94  White v City of London Brewery Co (1889) 42 ChD 237, 245 per Cotton LJ.  
95  For examples of a mortgagee failing to meet these requirements, see Australian and New Zealand 
Banking Group Ltd v Bangdilly Patoral Co Pty Ltd (1978) 52 ALJR 529 (HCA) and Tse Kwong Lam v 
Wong Chit Sen [1983] All ER 54 (PC). 
96  Farrar v Farrars Ltd (1888) 40 Ch D 395, 409 per Lindley LJ: "a sale by a person to himself is no sale 
at all". 
97  A receiver's agency is "clearly of a special kind": Re Tricorp Investments Ltd (1988) 4 NZCLC 64,620, 
64,624 per Thorp J (HC). 
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Both groups can repair and maintain the mortgaged property.99 Receivers are 
undoubtedly permitted to insure the property,100 and mortgagees in possession to protect 
the property from vandals.101  
Both groups can sue third parties in contract or tort.102 Receivers can sue in the 
mortgagor's name103 without the mortgagor's consent,104 although they may have to 
provide security for costs.105 This power is implied from the power to "get in" the 
mortgagor's assets, as without it that power might be illusory.106  
Finally, both groups can access all "books, documents and information" in the 
mortgagor's possession relating to the mortgaged property.107  
                                                                                                                                                                 
98  See generally Blanchard and Gedye, above n 39, para 10.05, 230-231; LNZ Receivers, above n 85, 
para 34, 42: "it would appear that there is no inflexible rule preventing a receiver from selling the 
property to the [mortgagee] or to a party in which the receiver has an interest." 
99  RA 1993, s 14(2)(e). Compare the position at common law: White v Metcalf [1903] 2 Ch 567; Visbord 
v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1943) 68 CLR 354, 382 (HCA). For mortgagees in possession, 
maintenance of the property out of received income is actually a duty. See Richards v Morgan 
(1753) 4 Y&C Ex 570; Leech v National Bank of New Zealand [1996] 3 NZLR 707, 713 per Paterson J 
(HC). 
100 RA 1993, s 14(2)(d). 
101 See Western Bank Ltd v Schindler (1976) 2 All ER 393, 396 per Buckley LJ (CA). 
102 Trustbank Canterbury Ltd v Lockwood Buildings Ltd [1994] 1 NZLR 666, 674-677 per Holland J (HC), 
stating that a mortgagee in possession can sue for trespass and conversion (affirmed as Lockwood 
Buildings v Trust Bank [1995] 1 NZLR 22 (CA)). Inglis Electrix Pty Ltd v Healing (Sales) Pty Ltd [1965] 
NSWR 1652 (NSW:SC), in which a receiver was allowed to sue for trespass and conversion. 
103 Generally not in their own name because no property, including causes of action, vests in them 
upon appointment: Robertson v Oskar [1984] (1983) 8 ACLR 570 (HCA); Re Sartoris's Estate [1892] 1 
Ch 11, 22 per Lindley J (CA). Examples of when receivers can bring their own actions are 
discussed in Re Sacker (1888) 22 QBD 179, 185 per Fry LJ. 
104 M Wheeler and Co Ltd v Warren [1928] 1 Ch 840 (CA). 
105 High Court Rules, R 60; District Court Rules 1992, R 61. See Attorney-General v Bell-Booth Group Ltd 
(1986) 3 NZCLC 99, 774 (CA) for principles of requesting security for costs. For an example of 
costs being awarded against a non-party receiver, see Knight v F P Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 
CLR 178 (HCA). 
106 M Wheeler & Co Ltd v Warren [1928] 1 Ch 840, 846 per Lawrence LJ (CA). 
107 PLA 1952, s 104FF; RA 1993, s 12. See also Richmond Equities Ltd v Interfauna Trading Co (NZ) Ltd 
(1988) 4 NZCLC 64, 606 (HC) where this right was extended to documents containing 
confidentiality clauses. 
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2 Freedom from interference 
Both groups enjoy general freedom from interference. Mortgagors cannot impeach the 
decisions of mortgagees in possession or receivers just because they, or even the court, 
would have acted differently.108 Although mortgagors are legally the receivers' 
principals,109 receivers "[are] not to receive directions from [mortgagors] but to give 
directions."110  
Some cases suggest that mortgagors can use their residual powers111 to contradict a 
mortgagee in possession or receiver's wishes. In Newhart Developments Ltd v Cooperative 
Commercial Bank Limited112 a company's directors were allowed to sue the debenture-
holder that put them into receivership even though the receiver did not consent.113 In Re 
Reprographic Exports114 a mortgagor's directors were able to oppose a winding-up order 
brought by a receiver. But later judgments have cast doubt on the correctness of Newhart 
Developments, suggesting that a division in power between mortgagee/receiver and 
mortgagor cannot exist, and that the mortgagor cannot manipulate the mortgaged 
property at all.115 
Third parties interfering with a mortgagee in possession or receiver can be restrained 
by injunction.116 The main exceptions are prior mortgagees, who by taking possession or 
appointing a receiver themselves can suspend the tenure of a mortgagee in possession or 
  
108 "The choice between alternative courses is for the secured creditor and for them alone": Re Neon 
Signs (Australasia) Ltd [1965] VR 125, 127 per Adam J (Vic:SC).  
109 Gomba Holdings UK Ltd v Minories Finance Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 1231, 1233 per Fox LJ (CA). 
110 Meigh v Wickenden [1942] 2 KB 160, 166 per Viscount Caldecote CJ, referring to a receiver's 
relationship with a company mortgagor's directors. 
111 A company mortgagor's Board retains all powers not delegated to the receiver. See MacDuff's Ltd 
v National Bank of NZ Ltd [1939] GLR 539, 540 per Myers CJ (SC); Brooklands Motor Co Ltd v Bridge 
Wholesale Acceptance Corporation (Australia) Ltd [1994] MCLR 193; Hawkesbury Development Co Ltd v 
Landmark Finance Pty Ltd [1969] 2 NSWR 782, 790 per Street J (NSW:SC): "A valid receivership and 
management will ordinarily supersede, but not destroy, the company's own organs through 
which it conducts its affairs." 
112 Newhart Developments Ltd v Cooperative Commercial Bank Limited [1978] 2 All ER 896 (CA). 
113 The New Zealand Court of Appeal has subsequently held that a mortgagor must always retain the 
right to pursue any dispute with the mortgagee over the mortgage agreement: Paramount 
Acceptance Co Ltd v Souster [1981] 2 NZLR 38 (CA). 
114 Re Reprographic Exports (1978) 122 Sol J 400. 
115 See Tudor Grange Holdings Ltd v Citibank NA [1991] 4 All ER 1, 10-11 per Browne-Wilkinson VC. 
116 See, for example, Bayley v Went (1884) 51 LT 764, where a mortgagor distrained against a tenant 
after the receiver's appointment. 
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receiver operating under a junior security,117 and the courts, which are statutorily 
empowered to terminate or limit possession or receivership if circumstances no longer 
justify its continuation.118 
C Rights and Powers Which Favour Entry into Possession  
1 Power to carry on business 
An important line of authority allows mortgagees in possession to run the business of a 
mortgagor notwithstanding that their security is a mortgage over land and not a company 
debenture. In County of Gloucester Bank v Rudry Merthyr Steam and House Coal Colliery 
Company,119 the defendant mortgaged their "colliery", which Lord Halsbury thought 
meant more than just the coal-mine and buildings: "What does ['colliery'] mean but that 
industrial occupation which we compendiously call a colliery?"120 The mortgage was 
found to pass the right to mine and sell coal. Lindley LJ added: "Bear in mind that if [the 
mortgagee does] nothing the mine will be swamped with water, and the property will not 
be … what it was intended to be, namely, a security for repayment of their money."121 In 
Gay v Johnson122 a mortgage over land from which a hotel operated was said to prima facie 
include the licence to operate the hotel, despite the mortgage containing no words to that 
effect.123  
In principle, receivers should possess a similar power. However, in Te Runanganui o 
Ngati Kahungunu Inc v Scott, a court-appointed receiver was to be given "the powers in 
s14(2) of the Receiverships Act 1993, and the power to carry on the business of the 
society."124 This juxtaposition suggests that a receiver's statutory power of management 
does not empower them to run a business. The New Zealand Law Commission also 
  
117 See Blanchard and Gedye, above n 39, para 4.22, 89. 
118 PLA 1952, s 104PP; RA 1993, s 35.  
119 County of Gloucester Bank v Rudry Merthyr Steam and House Coal Colliery Company [1895] 1 Ch 629 
(CA). 
120 County of Gloucester Bank v Rudry Merthyr Steam and House Coal Colliery Company [1895] 1 Ch 629, 
634 (CA). 
121 County of Gloucester Bank v Rudry Merthyr Steam and House Coal Colliery Company [1895] 1 Ch 629, 
638 (CA). 
122 Gay v Johnson (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 454. 
123 For examples of this power being expressed in the mortgagee, see Philp Trustee Co Ltd v Ironside 
Investments Pty Ltd [1984] 2 Qd R 16 (Qld:SC); Atkins v Mercantile Credits Ltd (1986) 10 ACLR 153 
(NSW:SC). 
124 Te Runanganui o Ngati Kahungunu Inc v Scott [1995] 1 NZLR 250, 251 per Neazor J (HC). 
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treated, "manage any of the property in receivership" and, "carry on any associated 
business", as separate powers,125 with the latter power eventually dropped. It thus 
appears that the power to run a business will not readily be implied from a receiver's 
power of management.  
2 Power to repudiate existing contracts 
Generally both groups can cancel the mortgagor's existing contracts with third parties, 
with the third party's claim for damages ranking behind the mortgagee's claim.126 
However, if the third party could have claimed specific performance or an equitable 
injunction against the mortgagor, a receiver, as the mortgagor's agent, is bound by that 
equity, preventing repudiation.127 Thus in Schering Pty Ltd v Forrest Pharmaceutical Co Pty 
Ltd128 a receiver had to honour a pre-receivership contract granting the plaintiff exclusive 
purchasing rights because the plaintiff had incurred large losses marketing the 
mortgagor's product.129  
Mortgagees in possession are not affected by this rule and can repudiate existing 
contracts more freely.130 However, their right to repudiate residential tenancies is limited 
by statute.131 
3 Right to ignore a corporate mortgagor's constitution 
Mortgagees in possession are not bound by the dictates of a corporate mortgagor's 
constitution. However, as receivers are theoretically delegated their powers by the 
mortgagor, any limits on a corporate mortgagor's powers, such as those enshrined in its 
constitution, should constrain the receiver.132  
  
125 NZLC R9, above n 29, Draft Property Law Amendment Act, cl 104AJ, 398. 
126 Quik Bake Products Ltd v New Zealand Baking Trade Employees Industrial Union of Workers (1990) 5 
NZCLC 66,701 (CA). 
127 S Dukeson "Company Pot-Pourri" [1989] NZLJ 141, 142. This will often be so if the contract is for 
the sale of unique goods: Butler v Countrywide Finance Ltd [1993] 3 NZLR 623 (HC).  
128 Schering Pty Ltd v Forrest Pharmaceutical Co Pty Ltd [1982] 1 NSWLR 286 (NSW:SC). 
129 Compare Airlines Airspares Ltd v Handley Page Ltd [1970] 1 All ER 29, where a similar application 
failed as the plaintiff could not, in this case, have claimed specific performance against the 
mortgagor. 
130 See below subsection VII B: Liabilities to Third Parties in Tort. 
131 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, s 58. 
132 LNZ Receivers, above n 85, para 32, 39. 
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An authority to the contrary is Re Emmadart Ltd,133 where a receiver brought a 
winding-up application against a mortgagor company. The mortgagor could not have 
brought this application without a shareholders' special resolution but Brightman J 
allowed the receiver's application, stating, "[t]he authority of a receiver is not … 
coterminous with the authority of the board of directors."134  
Re Emmadart is usually cited for the proposition that the power to apply for winding-
up is incidental to the power to protect and preserve a mortgagor's assets.135 Rarely, if 
ever, has the case been used to support the far more controversial claim that receivers can 
ignore mortgagors' constitutions. Indeed, since mortgagees can examine mortgagors' 
constitutions before lending money, their appointed receivers should be so constrained.  
4 Right to vacant possession  
Mortgagees in possession can require the removal of any chattels from the land136 and 
after taking physical possession can treat the mortgagor's chattels as those of a trespasser, 
with no obligation to care for them.137 
D Rights and Powers Which Favour Receivership 
1 Right to remuneration  
Receivers are usually paid by the mortgagee, but as agents of the mortgagor can also 
pay themselves directly from the mortgaged assets. This right is lost through unacceptable 
conduct,138 and any remuneration can be judicially scrutinised.139  
  
133 In Re Emmadart Ltd [1979] 1 All ER 599. 
134 In Re Emmadart Ltd [1979] 1 All ER 599, 605.  
135 See, for example, LNZ Receivers, above n 85, para 38, 46; Blanchard and Gedye, above n 39, para 
10.30, 253. 
136 Norwich Union Insurance Society v Preston [1957] 2 All ER 428. 
137 Jones v Foley [1891] 1 QB 730, 732 per Daly J. See generally ELG Tyler (ed) Fisher & Lightwood's Law 
of Mortgage (10 ed, Butterworths, London, 1988) 351-352.  
138 See, for example, Andrews v Ramsey & Co [1903] 2 KB 635 (agent took a secret commission); 
Greenwood v Harvey (1965) 83 WN Pt 2 NSW 374 (NSW:SC) (receiver colluded with purchaser of 
mortgagor's assets); New Zealand Farmers' Cooperative Distributing Co Ltd v National Mortgage and 
Agency Co of New Zealand Ltd [1961] NZLR 969 (SC) (agent failed to exhibit reasonable knowledge 
and skill). 
139 A wide range of people can initiate a remuneration review: RA 1993, s 34(2). For an example of 
remuneration fixing see Prior v Bagster (1887) 57 LT 760, where the receiver was granted 5% of the 
recovered assets' value.  
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Mortgagees in possession and their agents have no right to remuneration for the time 
spent managing the mortgagor's property.140 Equity once voided contractual provisions to 
the contrary because,141 having chosen not to appoint a receiver, a mortgagee could not 
charge a receiver's commission.142 Today the validity of such an agreement would depend 
on whether it was a permissible collateral advantage.143  
2 Power to sell mortgaged property 
The power of sale is implied into all mortgages unless negatived,144 and granted to all 
receivers by common law.145  Importantly, mortgagees cannot buy at their own sale but 
can buy from a receiver's sale.146  
3 Right to provision of essential services 
The suppliers of water, electricity, gas, or telecommunications147 cannot halt their 
supply to property in receivership simply because the mortgagor has outstanding 
debts.148 Mortgagees in possession are not similarly protected. 
4 Right to seek to judicial guidance 
Receivers can apply to the High Court for directions on how to exercise their powers149 
and will generally be immune from liability for any act or omission reliant on such 
  
140 Bonithon v Hockmore (1685) 1 Vern 316; Chambers v Goldwin (1804) 9 Ves 254.  
141 Comyns v Comyns (1871) IR 5 Eq 583, where a term entitling a mortgagee in possession to 100 
pounds a year was disallowed. See also French v Baron (1889) 2 Atk 120. 
142 Carew v Johnston (1805) 2 Sch & Lef 280, 301 per Lord Redesdale. 
143 See Biggs v Hoddinot [1898] 2 Ch 307 (CA); Young, above n 31, para 26.34, 445, stating that 
mortgagees in possession can recover charges for their services under an "agreement with the 
mortgagor".  
144 PLA 1952, s 78, and Fourth Schedule cl 8. 
145 In re Manchester and Milford Railway Co (1880) 14 Ch D 645, 653 per Jessel MR. 
146 Although such a sale will be carefully scrutinised: Blanchard and Gedye, above n 39, para 10.12, 
p237. 
147 RA 1993, s 40(1). 
148 RA 1993, s 40(3). 
149 RA 1993, s 34(1).  
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directions.150 The Court will advise only upon matters of law, not on factual matters of 
commercial judgment.151  
E How Do the Differences in Rights and Powers Affect the Choice of Remedy? 
Possession has the obvious advantage of allowing mortgagees to exert direct control 
over the land's management. American Express v Hurley152 shows that receivership 
generally requires mortgagees to adopt a "hands-off" approach.153 
Possession may be advantageous if a mortgagee wishes to run a pre-existing business 
from the land, turn out the mortgagor (vacant land fetches more than adversely occupied 
land), escape contractual obligations which would bind a receiver, or avoid restrictions in 
a corporate mortgagor's constitution. 
The disadvantages of possession are that mortgagees are less able to bill mortgagors for 
the time spent in possession, and cannot insulate themselves from liability by seeking 
judicial guidance on legally questionable decisions.  
Neither group enjoys complete freedom in choosing when and how to exercise these 
powers. Primarily, their choices are limited by the need to observe the equitable and 
statutory duties discussed below.  
VI DUTIES  
This article proposes that a "fundamental duty" exists which applies except where 
replaced or supplemented with a more stringent duty. The fundamental duty for 
mortgagees in possession is the equitable duty of good faith as described in Downsview 
Nominees v First City Corporation154. The fundamental duty for receivers is the more 
onerous, tiered duty prescribed by section 18 of the Receiverships Act 1993.  
These duties are enforced primarily by courts awarding damages or issuing 
preventative injunctions.155 Receivers are subject to additional controls: numerous 
  
150 RA 1993, s 37(6). 
151 Re Blastclean Services Ltd  (1985) 2 NZCLC 99,282, 99,285 per Barker J (HC). 
152 American Express International Banking Corporation v Hurley [1985] 3 All ER 564. 
153 See below sub-section V F 3: Direct control of a receiver by the appointing mortgagee. 
154 Downsview Nominees Ltd v First City Corporation [1993] 1 NZLR 513 (PC) [Downsview].  
155 For a discussion of the possible grounds for awarding an injunction, see New Zealand Commentary 
on Halsbury's Laws of England (4 ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 1989) binder E, Mortgage, para 
C725, 56; George Hinde and Donald McMorland Land Law in New Zealand (1 ed, Butterworths, 
Wellington, 1997), para 8.132, 749-752. 
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interested parties can petition the High Court to order them to comply with their duties,156 
they can be removed if they breach such an order157 or otherwise misconduct 
themselves,158 and their conduct is scrutinised during a corporate mortgagor's 
liquidation.159 The New Zealand Law Commission's suggestion that similar judicial 
controls apply to mortgagees in possession was not taken up.160 
A The Fundamental Equitable Duty of Mortgagees  
1 The duty defined  
The New Zealand Court of Appeal in Downsview held that mortgagees and receivers 
owed a duty in negligence to act with reasonable care in all their actions.161 This 
conclusion was reached after applying the two-stage "Anns test" (used to establish new 
categories of negligence liability)162 and supported with reference to Cuckmere Brick Co Ltd 
v Mutual Finance Ltd163. Equity was rejected as the duty's source: "if there were any duties 
on the part of [the appointor] and [the receiver] ... they would have to based in 
negligence."164  
On appeal, the Privy Council, "considerably troubled by the approach of the Courts 
below",165 unequivocally stated that the duties of mortgagees and receivers lay in equity 
alone.166 Their general duty, owed to the mortgagor and subsequent encumbrancers167 
  
156 RA 1993, s 37. 
157 RA 1993, s 37(5). 
158 This can be done under the court's equitable jurisdiction: Re Neon Signs (Australasia) Ltd [1965] VR 
125, 127 per Adams J (Vic:SC). 
159 Companies Act 1993, s 301. See generally Blanchard and Gedye, above n 39, para 11.41, 316-317.  
160 New Zealand Law Commission "The PLA 1952: A Discussion Paper" (Law Commission, 
Wellington, 1991) Preliminary Paper No 16, para 309, 101. 
161 First City Corporation v Downsview Nominees Ltd [1990] 3 NZLR 265 (CA). 
162 Anns v London Merton-Borough Council [1978] AC 728, 751-752 per Lord Wilberforce (HL). English 
courts have subsequently retreated from this test: Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605, 
617 per Lord Bridge, 649 per Lord Oliver; Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398 
(HL). 
163 Cuckmere Brick Co Ltd v Mutual Finance Ltd [1971] 1 Ch 949 (CA) [Cuckmere Brick].  
164 First City Corporation v Downsview Nominees Ltd [1990] 3 NZLR 265, 272 per Richardson J (CA). 
165 Downsview Nominees Ltd v First City Corporation [1993] 1 NZLR 513, 521 per Lord Templeman (PC). 
166 Downsview Nominees Ltd v First City Corporation [1993] 1 NZLR 513, 526 (PC). 
167 But see Andrew Hogan "Receivers Revisited" (1996) 17 Company Lawyer 226, 229 suggesting that 
the duty owed to subsequent encumbrancers should be stricter than good faith.  
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(and according to other cases, guarantors and suretors)168 was to act in good faith for the 
purpose of obtaining repayment, a less onerous duty than one based in negligence.  
"Good faith" is a, "protean term having longstanding usage in a variety of … 
contexts".169 In the Downsview context, this duty is breached only by intentional behaviour 
amounting to "some dishonesty, improper motive or … bad faith",170 although 
recklessness might also suffice.171 
2 Why was a duty in negligence rejected?  
Lord Templeman, who delivered the Council's opinion, had previously shown disdain 
for negligence's rapid infestation of the law of obligations: "since Anns v Merton London 
Borough Council ... put the floodgates on the jar, a fashionable plaintiff alleges negligence. 
The pleading assumes we are all neighbours now, Pharisees and Samaritans alike ... and 
that for every mischance in an accident-prone world someone solvent must be liable in 
damages."172 And later; "the [Hong Kong] Court of Appeal sought to find a duty in the 
tort of negligence but the tort of negligence has not yet subsumed all torts and does not 
supplant the principles of equity".173 This suggests that Downsview reflected a policy of 
restricting negligence rather than an open-minded consideration of the appropriate 
standard of care. Negligence liability in the sphere of mortgages would have also allowed 
recovery for pure economic loss, an unfavoured outcome.174 
  
168 See China & South Sea Bank Ltd v Tan Goon Sin [1989] 3 All ER 839 (PC); Ent v McVeigh (4 October 
1996) unreported, Tasmanian Supreme Court, A61/1996, per Slicer J, refusing an application for 
summary judgment that the duty was not owed to guarantors. But compare Clyde Industries Ltd v 
Dittes (5 June 1992) unreported, New South Wales Supreme Court, per Cole J) which recognised 
some complications arising from this extension.  
169 Secretary, Department of Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs v Prince (21 November 
1997) unreported, NSW Federal Court, per Finn J, 1997 AUST FEDCT LEXIS 1072).  
170 Medforth v Blake [1999] 3 All ER 87 per Sir Richard Scott VC. See also Kennedy v De Trafford [1896] 1 
Ch 762, 772 per Lindley J (CA) [affirmed [1897] AC 180 (HL)] stating that only the fraudulent, 
wilful or reckless sacrifice of the mortgagor's interests would amount to a breach of the duty of 
good faith; Goldcel Nominees Pty Ltd v Network Finance Ltd [1983] 2 VR 257, 261 per Murphy J 
(Vic:SC): "'In good faith' must, in my opinion, import a subjective element of honesty, fairness and 
lack of fraud or collusion."  
171 Moritzson Properties Ltd v McLachlan [1994] 3 NZLR 250 (HC); Barns v Queensland National Bank Ltd 
(1906) 3 CLR 925 (HCA).  
172 CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics Plc [1988] 1 AC 1013, 1059 (HL). 
173 China and South Sea Bank v Tan Soon Gin [1989] 3 All ER 839, 841 (PC).  
174 Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398 (HL). 
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Lord Templeman's more reasoned basis for rejecting negligence-based duties was that 
they would require substantial regard to be given to the interests of the mortgagor and 
third parties, clashing with a mortgagee or receiver's primary obligation to repay the 
mortgagee's loan. This reasoning came from Re B Johnson & Co (Builders) Ltd, where 
receivers were said to owe a primary duty to their appointors which altered the emphasis 
to be placed on various parties' interests.175 Similarly in Kennedy v de Trafford, "a 
mortgagee is not a trustee ... his right is to look after himself first",176 and in Newhart 
Developments Ltd v Co-operative Commercial Bank Ltd, "[t]he receiver is entitled to ignore the 
claims of anybody outside the debenture holders."177 While this latter statement no longer 
represents New Zealand law,178 it illustrates the traditional tolerance for the partiality of 
mortgagees and receivers which negligence liability undermines.  
In theory, receivers focused on rescuing a mortgagor's business, rather than repaying 
the mortgagee, might be less entitled to discount other parties' interests.179 But in New 
Zealand, where receivers are not "white knight[s]"180 and must pursue their appointor's 
interests, this point is moot. 
In New Zealand, the fundamental duty of good faith applied to both mortgagees and 
receivers from November 1992181  until July 1994, when the Receiverships Act 1993 came 
into effect.  
B The Fundamental Statutory Duty of Receivers  
Receivers must act in good faith182 and in their appointor's best interests.183 Essentially 
this encapsulates the Downsview decision. However, unlike mortgagees, receivers have a 
  
175 In Re B Johnson & Co (Builders) Ltd [1955] Ch 634, 661-662 per Jenkins LJ (CA). 
176 Kennedy v de Trafford [1896] 1 Ch 762, 772 per Lindley J (CA) (affirmed [1897] AC 180 (HL)). 
177 Newhart Developments Ltd v Co-operative Commercial Bank Ltd [1978] 2 All ER 896, 900 per Shaw J 
(CA). 
178 See the RA 1993, s 18(3).  
179 See Andrew Hogan "Receivers Revisited" (1996) 17 Company Lawyer 226, 230, criticising the 
equation of the duties of mortgagee and receiver as "ludicrous". For a detailed discussion of a 
receiver's potential "rescue" function in England see Gabriel Moss "Comparative Bankruptcy 
Cultures: Rescue of Liquidation? Comparison of Trends in National Law - England" (1997) 23 
Brooklyn J Intl L 115. 
180 First City Corporation v Downsview Nominees Ltd [1990] 3 NZLR 265, 275 per Richardson J (CA). 
181 The date of the Downsview decision. 
182 RA 1993, s 18(1). 
183 RA 1993, s 18(2). 
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secondary duty to reasonably regard the interests of the mortgagor, persons claiming 
through the mortgagor, and the mortgagor's unsecured creditors and suretors.184 This 
duty has been described as a "marked departure" from Downsview.185 It perpetuates the 
fundamental inconsistency of owing duties of care to both mortgagee and mortgagor.186  
As to what level of "regard" is "reasonable", a principle eluded to in Hodson v Deans 
states that more "regard" may be necessary when there is a "real or substantial possibility, 
rather than a probability",187 of assets being left over after the mortgagee's loan is 
repaid.188  
The exceptions and qualifications to these fundamental duties are now discussed. 
C A Mortgagee's General Duty Under the Credit Contracts Act 1981 
If mortgagees, including those in possession, exercise their powers in an "oppressive" 
manner189 the courts have a wide remedial discretion and can direct mortgagees, "to do or 
refrain from doing in relation to any other party any act or thing."190 Allegations of 
oppressive conduct can be made in any court proceeding.191 
Although mortgagees, unlike receivers, must be mindful of this statutory complement 
to their equitable duties, the potential for overturning a mortgagee's desired course of 
conduct is limited because if the mortgage's terms are not oppressive on their face, then 
"the exercise of the legal rights given to the mortgagee under that contract will not 
normally be held to be oppressive."192  
  
184 RA 1993, s 18(3).  
185 Andrew Beck and Andrew Borrowdale Guidebook to New Zealand Companies and Securities 
Legislation (6 ed, CCH New Zealand Ltd, Auckland) para 1313, 380.  
186 A McRae "Duties of a Receiver" (1994) 73 Accountants' J 54. 
187 Hodson v Deans (1903) 2 Ch 647, 652 per Joyce J, "[A mortgagee] is under certain obligations to the 
mortgagor, especially where the security is ample" [emphasis added]. 
188 See also Sewell v Agricultural Bank of Western Australia (1930) 44 CLR 104, 110 (HCA). 
189 Credit Contracts Act 1981, s 10(b). "Oppressive" means "oppressive, harsh, unjustly burdensome, 
unconscionable, or in contravention of reasonable standards of commercial practice": Credit 
Contracts Act 1981, s 9. 
190 Credit Contracts Act 1981, s 14(1)(f).  
191 Credit Contracts Act 1981, s 10. 
192 Young, above n31, para 23.21, 385. But this arguably contradicts the wording of the Credits 
Contracts Act 1981, s 10(b). 
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D A Mortgagee's Duty Upon Entering into Possession 
Centuries ago, mortgagees' legal ownership of mortgaged property, plus mortgagors' 
equitable interest (their equity of redemption), led to the conclusion that mortgagees held 
mortgaged property on trust.193 As trustees, and because equity considered mortgages to 
be no more than a device to secure repayment, mortgagees in possession were required to 
diligently pursue such repayment,194 and were liable for any mismanagement reducing 
the level of income available to repay their loan. Thus mortgagees in possession had to 
account on the footing of wilful default, delivering to those interested in the equity of 
redemption195 income derived from the land plus money representing what should have 
been derived but for their "wilful default".  
One of the earliest reported mortgagee possession cases reads, "mortgagee shall not 
account for more than he actually receives, unless where he has been guilty of a wilful 
default."196 These early cases offered little on the meaning of "wilful default", although 
fraud and bad faith were obviously included.197 Later, in Hughes v Williams, "wilful 
default" was said to include "plain, obvious and gross negligence".198 Arguably then, the 
duty to avoid wilful default imposes a standard of care between "good faith" and 
"negligence" standards.  
Examples of wilful default include rejecting a satisfactory tenant willing to pay more 
than the rent eventually received,199 and letting premises subject to a covenant which 
reduces the rent.200 However, it is not wilful default to accept reduced rent if the lower-
paying tenant is more credit-worthy, or if accepting a new, higher-paying tenant would 
erase the mortgagee's right to recover the current tenant's rent in arrears.201 Nor does a 
  
193 Peter Devonshire "The Mortgagee's Power of Sale: A Case for the Equitable Standard of Good 
Faith" (1995) 46 NILQ 182, 183. 
194 Lord Kensington v Bouverie (1855) 7 De GM&G 134, 157 per Turner LJ. 
195 Namely the mortgagor plus any subsequent encumbrancers of which the mortgagee was aware: 
Parker v Calcraft (1821) 6 Madd 11. 
196 Anon (1682) 1 Vern 45. Other early cases include Duke of Bucks v Gayer (1684) 1 Vern 258; Coppring 
v Cook (1684) 1 Vern 270.   
197 Interestingly, Anonymous (1675) 1 Chan Cas 258 suggested that only fraud would trigger liability. 
198 Hughes v Williams (1806) 12 Ves Jun 494, 494 per Lord Erskine LC. See also Wragg v Denham (1836) 
2 Y&C Ex 117, 122 per Alderson B. 
199 Anon (1682) 1 Vern 45. 
200 White v City of London Brewery Co (1889) 42 ChD 237, 244, although here the mortgagor could not 
prove such a shortfall. 
201 ELG Tyler (ed) Fisher & Lightwood's Law of Mortgage (10 ed, Butterworths, London, 1988) 369. 
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refusal to embark on adventures and speculations, such as operating an existing mine, 
qualify.202 More generally, mortgagors cannot involve the courts in minute inquiries over 
what income might have been achieved.203 Nor can they stand idly by while their land is 
under-utilised only to claim an inflated account; they must help the mortgagee maximise 
their land's productivity.204  
E The Unique Duty Owed When Selling Mortgaged Property 
1 Why is this duty treated separately?  
The paring of this duty from the general duties owed by mortgagees and receivers was 
finalised by Cuckmere Brick.205 Here, a mortgagee sold mortgaged land without publicising 
that planning permission for flats had been granted. The English Court of Appeal 
reviewed numerous cases in which mortgagees were supposedly liable for such  
carelessness. For example in Wolff v Vanderzee, a mortgagee in possession sold land with its 
rent wrongly noted as 150, instead of 182, pounds per year, Vice Chancellor Stuart said 
that a mortgagee in possession holds a "position of responsibility", and if "he fails to take 
every proper precaution to secure the best price, his conduct is equivalent to wilful neglect 
and default."206 In National Bank of Australasia v United Hand-in-Hand and Band of Hope Co, a 
mortgagee sold the mortgagor's property for 6,000 pounds after rejecting 8,000 pounds. 
The Privy Council said that the mortgagee would be charged for any shortfall, "owing to 
the want of due care and diligence."207  
In Cuckmere Brick, Lord Justice Salmon said of these cases, "[i]t would seem therefore 
that many years before the modern development of … negligence, the courts of equity had 
laid down a doctrine in relation to mortgages which is entirely consonant with the general 
principles [of negligence]."208 Cuckmere Brick translated this equitable doctrine into 
contemporary parlance; the mortgagee's "position of responsibility" equated to being the 
mortgagor's "neighbour" (in the Donoghue v Stevenson209 sense), and equity's variously 
  
202 Hughes v Williams (1806) 12 Ves Jun 494.  
203 ELG Tyler (ed) Fisher & Lightwood's Law of Mortgage (10 ed, Butterworths, London, 1988) 369. 
204 Hughes v Williams (1806) 12 Ves 493. 
205 Cuckmere Brick Co Ltd v Mutual Finance Ltd [1971] 1 Ch 949 (CA). 
206 Wolff v Vanderzee (1869) 20 LT 353, 354. 
207 National Bank of Australasia v United Hand-in-Hand and Band of Hope Co (1879) 4 App Cas 391, 411 
per Sir James W Colville. 
208 Cuckmere Brick Co Ltd v Mutual Finance Ltd [1971] 1 Ch 949, 967 (CA). 
209 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (HL), per Lord Atkin. 
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described duty to "take every possible precaution" and exhibit "due care and diligence", 
became the duty of "reasonable care" that is negligence's hall-mark. Mortgagees and 
receivers were therefore subjected to a duty, grounded in negligence, to take reasonable 
care to get a "proper price" upon sale.  
But arguably the Court misinterpreted or misapplied many of the cited precedents. 
Some cases contained clear statements that mortgagees should be liable only if guilty of 
some mental culpability higher than carelessness.210 In other cases, including Wolff and 
National Bank of Australasia, the duty stricter than good faith was imposed simply because 
the case dealt with the established liability to account for wilful default.211  
Furthermore, Cuckmere Brick's creation of a new, negligence-based duty would have 
been unnecessary if the Court had taken the subsequently suggested view that the duty to 
get a proper price is part of the duty of good faith.212 Although cases such Re B Johnson & 
Co (Builders) Ltd decreed that a duty of good faith could not oblige someone to get the best 
possible price,213 it could still oblige someone to carefully pursue a proper price. Thus the 
protection afforded to mortgagors by Cuckmere Brick could arguably have been achieved 
through established equitable duties instead.214  
Rightly or wrongly, Cuckmere Brick separated from the equitable duty of good faith a 
more onerous duty of reasonable care upon sale. Although Downsview established that this 
  
210 For example, the cited case of National Bank of Australasia v United Hand-in-Hand and Band of Hope 
Co (1879) 4 App Cas 391, 409 (PC), where the need for "wilful" negligence or default was 
emphasised; Tomlin v Luce (1889) 41 Ch D 573, 575 (affirmed (1889) 43 Ch D 191 (CA)) per 
Kekewich J, where it was said that only oppression or dishonesty would attract liability. See 
generally Peter Devonshire "The Mortgagee's Power of Sale: A Case for the Equitable Standard of 
Good Faith" (1995) 46 NILQ 182, 193. 
211 The same was true of Marriott v The Anchor Reversionary Co (1861) 3 De GF&J 177 (mortgagee raced 
ships to their detriment) and McHugh v Union Bank of Canada [1913] AC 299 (PC) (mortgagee drove 
horses until some died).   
212 Forsyth v Blundell (1973) 129 CLR 477, 481 per Menzies J dissenting on the application of the test to 
the facts (HCA). See the recent statements supporting this proposition in Moritzson Properties Ltd v 
McLachlan [1994] 3 NZLR 250, 255 per Fraser J (HC). But compare Edward Sykes and Sally Walker 
The Law of Securities (5 ed, Sydney, Law Book Co, 1993) 119 describing Menzies J's conclusion as 
"rather remarkable". 
213 In Re B Johnson & Co (Builders) Ltd [1955] Ch 634, 662 per Jenkins LJ (CA). 
214 But see S Robinson "Lenders' (and Receivers') Liability When Selling: The Need to Resort to Basic 
Principles" (1994) 68 ALJ 206, suggesting that the duty of good faith would not provide sufficient 
protection.  
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duty lay in equity, not negligence, Lord Templeman missed the opportunity to re-associate 
the two duties.215  
2 New Zealand's statutory formulation of the duty upon sale  
In New Zealand, both receivers and mortgagees in possession must take reasonable 
care to obtain the "best price reasonably obtainable at the time of sale".216 What amounts 
to reasonable care will vary from case to case.217 Mortgagees owe this duty to the 
"mortgagor", which by statutory definition includes subsequent encumbrancers.218 
However, receivers owe their duty to the mortgagor, persons claiming through the 
mortgagor (including subsequent encumbrancers, but probably not shareholders219 or 
beneficiaries220), plus the mortgagor's unsecured creditors and suretors.221 A mortgagee's 
duty to these additional people is governed solely by their duty of good faith. 
The choice of when to sell is probably governed by the fundamental duties described 
above.222 This will probably not oblige mortgagees or receivers to delay their sale in 
  
215 Downsview Nominees v First City Corporation [1992] 1 NZLR 513, 524 (PC). 
216 PLA 1952, s 103A; RA 1993, s19 (see also the previous formulation in the Companies Act 1955, s 
345B). The difference in terminology from Cuckmere Brick's "proper price" is insignificant: Nathan 
Securities Ltd v Stavefield Holdings No 29 Ltd (1994) ANZ Conv R 90, 91 per Hardie Boys J (CA).  
217 For a list of sixteen possible requirements see Young, above n 31, para 23.15, 382-383. 
218 PLA 1952, s 2 "mortgagor" includes anyone entitled to redeem a mortgage, and subsequent 
mortgagees can redeem a prior mortgage. Compare Young, above n 31, para 23.14, 381 who does 
not believe subsequent encumbrancers are included.  
219 Rogers v Bullen (1992) 6 NZCLC 67,636, 67,642 per Holland J (HC). But compare Andrew Beck and 
Andrew Borrowdale Guidebook to New Zealand Companies and Securities Legislation (6 ed, CCH New 
Zealand Ltd, Auckland), para 1314, 382.  
220 Parker-Tweedale v Dunbar Bank Plc [1991] Ch 12 (CA). 
221 RA 1993, s 19. 
222 Blanchard and Gedye, above n 39, para 11.32, 310. But compare Frances Xavier "Should a 
Mortgagee Owe a Duty of Care in Considering Whether or Not to Exercise its Power of Sale?" 
[1993] Qld LSJ 109, 118. 
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anticipation of improved market conditions,223 although the contrary has been 
suggested.224  
F Downsview Revisited in Medforth v Blake  
In Medforth v Blake,225 receivers of a pig-farming company bought feed without taking 
advantage of readily available discounts for bulk purchases. They argued that under 
Downsview they could be liable only if their actions were not in good faith. But Sir Richard 
Scott VC held that Downsview was authority only for the proposition than a receiver's 
duties lie in equity,226 and the exact equitable duty applied would vary from case to case. 
Here, the applicable duty was said to be managing the property with "due diligence and 
care", and accordingly the receivers were liable.  
The next section seeks to place these recent changes to the duties of mortgagees and 
receivers in their historical context. 
G Equity's On-Going Development  
Earlier sections recounted how equity has oscillated between rules favouring a 
mortgagor's right to recover their property227 and rules favouring a mortgagee's right to 
enforce their security.228 Cuckmere Brick, Downsview and Medforth neatly illustrate how the 
see-saw between these competing rights continues today.  
1 Three decades of redefining equitable duties  
Cuckmere Brick tilted the balance towards the mortgagor by founding the duty upon 
sale in negligence, thereby opening the door to the general doctrine of negligence-based 
  
223 Henry Roach (Petroleum) Pty Ltd v Credit House (Vic) Pty Ltd [1976] VR 309, 313 per Lush J (Vic:SC); 
Countrywide Banking  Corporation v Robinson [1991] 1 NZLR 75, 77 per Cooke P (CA); Garden City 
Developments Ltd v Cavell Leitch Pringle & Boyle Nominees Ltd (28 April 1993) unreported, Court of 
Appeal, CA 63/93 (CA); Tse Kwong Lam v Wong Chit Sen [1983] 3 All ER 54, 59 per Lord 
Templeman (PC).  
224 See Peter Devonshire "The Mortgagee's Power of Sale: New Perspectives on an Old Theme" (1995) 
16 NZULR 251, 262-264. 
225 Medforth v Blake [1999] 3 All ER 97 (CA) [Medforth]. 
226 The Court had earlier declined an invitation to criticise Downsview: see Yorkshire Bank Plc v Hall 
[1999] 1 ER 897 (CA). 
227 For example, equity's creation of an equitable right of redemption and holding mortgagees in 
possession to account on the footing of wilful default. 
228 For example, equity's refusal to undermine a mortgagee's legal right to possession, encouragement 
of the use of private receivership to circumvent the liability for wilful default, and the various 
rules softening the application of this liability. 
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recovery later embraced by the New Zealand Court of Appeal.229 The Privy Council then 
condemned this idea in Downsview, restoring a historic advantage of receivership over 
possession: whereas the liability for wilful default restricted what a mortgage in 
possession could do with mortgaged property, their appointed receivers, owing only a 
duty of good faith, enjoyed a wider spectrum of management options. For instance, under 
Downsview a receiver could ignore freely available discounts on feed whereas a mortgagee 
in possession could not, and could generally pursue recovery of the mortgagee's loan with 
far greater ignorance of other parties' interests than could a mortgagee in possession.  
To Sir Richard Scott, Downsview swung the balance too far in the mortgagee's favour: if 
a mortgagor could hold mortgagees to account for their wilful default, why should they 
have to suffer fools as receivers? A new rule permitting mortgagors to recover for 
mismanagement was needed. Downsview had forbidden the use of negligence for this 
purpose, but by cleverly limiting Downsview's ratio, a similar result was developed in 
equity. Medforth thus imposed on English receivers a standard of care similar to that 
arising from a mortgagee in possession's liability for wilful default. This effect is lost in 
New Zealand, however, because receivers' duties are now statute-based.230 
2 Future developments 
The tension between Downsview and Medforth may resolve itself in one of two ways: 
either a higher authority will reinstate good faith as the fundamental duty of all receivers 
(thus reaffirming Downsview and In Re B Johnson & Co (Builders) Ltd), or else Medforth will 
be used to attack other duties presently defined by good faith alone. In New Zealand, 
good faith remains the only duty owed before the remedies of possession or sale are 
exercised and so Medforth provides ammunition for arguing that decisions such as the 
choice of receiver and timing of sale should be governed by a duty more stringent than 
good faith. 
The next section investigates whether the current differences in duties are of practical 
significance to mortgagees.  
H How Do the Differences in Duties Impact the Choice of Remedy? 
In summary, mortgagees must avoid oppressive conduct, act in good faith (a general 
duty threatened by Medforth) and, upon entering into possession, avoid behaviour 
amounting to wilful default.231 The benefactors of these duties vary, but do not extend 
  
229 First City Corporation v Downsview Nominees Ltd [1990] 3 NZLR 265 (CA). 
230 RA 1993, ss 18, 19. 
231 Interestingly the New Zealand Bankers' Association's Code of Banking Practice advocates a 
standard of care more stringent than that required by law, stating that banks will act "fairly" and 
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beyond the mortgagor, subsequent encumbrancers, guarantors and suretors. In contrast, a 
mortgagee's appointed receiver must act in good faith and, to the extent consistent with 
that duty, have reasonable regard to the interests of others, including a potentially long list 
of unsecured creditors. Both groups owe an identical duty upon sale, but again a receiver's 
duty is owed to more people. Additionally, there are statutory procedures in place for 
challenging a receiver's actions which do not exist for mortgagees in possession.  
The question is whether these differences translate into any appreciable advantages for 
receivership or possession. The answer lies in investigating whether, in light of their 
duties, mortgagees in possession or receivers enjoy greater freedom with respect to when 
and how their powers may be exercised. On this criteria receivership was the better option 
under Downsview because receivers did not suffer any restriction akin to a mortgagee in 
possession's need to act without wilful default. But the recent imposition of statutory 
duties based on negligence principles has reigned in receivers' freedom to act to a level 
similar to that of mortgagees in possession. Receivers now have a (secondary) duty to 
regard numerous parties' interests, owe their duties to more people, and can have their 
actions judicially challenged by various parties. In theory,232 this could preclude many 
courses of action previously open to them under Downsview. These extra duties also mean 
that prudent receivers should spend time checking and recording the interests of 
numerous people and seeking the court's blessing before embarking on potentially risky 
ventures.233 Both these tasks will delay the exercise of a receiver's powers in a manner not 
experienced by mortgagees in possession.  
Thus one can say with certainty that New Zealand's recent law changes have 
diminished one of the advantages that mortgagees gained through receivership: the ability 
to have the mortgaged property used in a variety of ways conducive to the quick and full 
recovery of their loan. 
The next section outlines the various liabilities which also guide the exercise of a 
mortgagee or receiver's powers. 
VII LIABILITIES 
This section investigates the differences between the costs for which receivers and 
mortgagees in possession are prima facie responsible for paying. Ultimately most of these 
                                                                                                                                                                 
"reasonably". See Mark Russell, Stuart Walker & John King (eds) "New Zealand" (1997) 8 J 
Banking Law & Practice 86. 
232 The question of whether the actual practice of receivers has been changed by the RA 1993 would 
require empirical research and is not pursued here. 
233 RA 1993, s 34. 
 
 THE MORTGAGEE REMEDIES OF ENTRY INTO POSSESSION AND RECEIVERSHIP 697 
costs will be brought home to the mortgagor through an implied or contractual indemnity. 
Receivers, as agents, are automatically indemnified by the mortgagor for all personal 
liabilities234 except those, "incurred in consequence of [their] negligence or default".235 
Mortgagees in possession, in contrast, can only receive an indemnity through contract.  
A Liability to Third Parties for Contractual Debts  
Both groups are personally liable for new contracts they make and for existing 
contracts of the mortgagor they adopt.236 There are four main exceptions. First, only 
mortgagees in possession, as deemed reversioners,237 automatically inherit the burden of 
leasehold covenants which touch and concern the land.238  Secondly, both groups are 
liable for paying the mortgagor's rent,239 although mortgagees in possession need only 
pay rent out of income from the land.240 Thirdly, receivers are personally liable for 
meeting the mortgagor's hire-purchase payments.241 Mortgagees in possession, if they 
wish to use the mortgagor's hired property, will have to negotiate a separate hire-purchase 
contract. Fourthly, if a mortgagee in possession wishes to retain employees' services they 
will be personally liable for all an employer's obligations, including paying wages and 
salaries. This is because entry into possession of a business terminates all employment 
contracts,242 meaning that subsequent employment must be under new contracts. Thus a 
mortgagee in possession acquires all the statutory obligations of an "employer",243 and is 
  
234 Just as any agent is entitled to an indemnity from their principal: Adamson v Jarvis (1827) 4 Bing 66; 
Thacker v Hardy (1878) 4 QB 685. 
235 RA Price Securities Ltd v Henderson [1989] 2 NZLR 257, 265 per Somers J (CA). 
236 Halsbury's Laws of England (4 ed, Butterworths, London, 1980) vol 32, Mortgage, para 693, 316;  RA 
1993, s 32(1).  
237 PLA 1952, s 91(11). 
238 P&A Swift Investments v Combined English Stores Group Plc [1989] 1 AC 632 (HL). Covenants 
personal to the landlord mortgagor will not pass. 
239 Compare the position under the general law Re J W Abbott & Co (1913) WN 284 (entry into 
possession does not imply a willingness to pay the mortgagor's rents); Rangatira Proprietary Ltd v 
Viola Hallam Ltd [1957] NZLR 1188, 1191 per Shorland J (SC) (dealing with receivers).  
240 Compare LTA 1952, s 110 and RA 1993, s 32(5). A receiver's personal liability is limited to rent 
accruing after the receivership's fourteenth day: RA 1993, s 32(6).  
241 RA 1993, s 32(5). Again this liability is limited to fees accruing after the receivership's fourteenth 
day: RA 1993, s 32(6). 
242 Reid v The Explosives Company Ltd (1887) 19 QBD 264, 267 per Lord Esher MR (although these 
statements were obiter dicta as the case concerned court-appointed receivers).  
243 For example, purchasing insurance against work-place accidents: Accident Insurance Act 1998, s 
169.  
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liable for breaching any term of their employment contracts. In contrast, receivers are only 
liable for employees' salary and wages244 and, unless they hire or re-hire employees, or 
adopt existing employment contracts, are not liable for breaching other terms in the 
employees' contracts.  
B Liability to Third Parties in Tort 
Both groups are personally liable for their own torts such as trespass, nuisance or 
conversion.245 Additionally, when repudiating or otherwise preventing the performance 
of a mortgagor's existing contracts, mortgagees in possession risk liability for the tort of 
inducing breach of contract. Receivers who act within their powers and duties are 
generally immune from this tort because agents cannot be liable for causing their 
principals to breach contracts.246 
C Liability for Breach of Duty 
Both groups are personally liable to pay all costs, including damages awarded to 
injured parties, associated with breaching their duties.  
An important development in this area concerns the possible erosion of the rule that 
mortgagees are not liable for their receivers' misconduct.247 In recent years the suggestion 
has arisen that mortgagees may be liable for appointing incompetent receivers,248 and may 
further be liable if, in breach of their duty of good faith, they fail to use their power to 
remove a receiver guilty of gross misconduct. In Dawson v Southern Communications (1979) 
Ltd, Master Towle theorised that in "extreme circumstances" a receiver's appointor could be 
liable for failing to remove a receiver who "acted dishonestly or with total neglect of his 
responsibilities."249 This would widen a mortgagor's ability to recover damages for the 
  
244 "Wage" has been given a wide definition: Re R McGaffin Ltd [1938] NZLR 764 (SC), where it was 
held to include sums agreed to be paid for living or other expenses. Receivers can avoid any such 
liability by notifying employees of their termination within the receivership's first fourteen days: 
RA 1993, s 32((1)(b).  For the notice's requirements see Re Weddel New Zealand Ltd [1998] 1 NZLR 
(CA). 
245 LNZ Receivers, above n 85, para 51, 56. 
246 Said v Butt [1920] 3 KB 497; Lathia v Dronsfield Bros Ltd [1987] BCLC 321, 324. However, receivers 
may be liable if the third party can establish a proprietary interest in the contractual property, see 
Telematrix Plc v Modern Engineers of Bristol (Holdings) Plc [1985] BCLC 213, receivers joined as 
parties due to possible tort liability for threatening to repudiate contract granting creditor a lien 
over meat. 
247 American Express International Banking Corporation v Hurley [1985] 3 All ER 564, 571 per Mann J.  
248 Shamji v Johnson Matthey Bankers Ltd [1986] BCLC 278, 283 per Hoffmann J. 
249 Dawson v Southern Communications (1979) Ltd (1992) 6 NZCLC 68,123, 68,130 (HC). 
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mismanagement of their property, and is further evidence that in its ongoing search for 
balance equity is currently re-emphasising the rights of mortgagors.  
D Other Specific Liabilities 
1 Liability for rates  
Entry into possession does not cause a mortgagor's obligation as landowner to pay 
rates to cease,250 but first mortgagees are answerable for a mortgagor's unpaid rates.251 
Receivers are only liable for rates if they dispossess the mortgagor of the land so as to 
acquire the status of an "occupier".252  
2 Liability for occupation rent  
Mortgagees in possession who occupy the land may be charged an occupation rent. 
Whereas it was once thought that "if a mortgagee enters into possession of the lands, he is 
always charged with the utmost value they are proved to be worth", 253 this gave way to 
the current wisdom that the occupation rental need only be "fair"254 and indeed will be 
nothing if the property has no rental value.255  
Receivers, as agents of the mortgagor, are not liable for rent.256  
3 Potential liability as a "shadow director" 
If a corporate mortgagor is allowed to continue operating their business from the land, 
a mortgagee in possession or receiver should refrain from directing the mortgagor's 
  
250 See the term in the PLA 1952, Fourth Schedule, cl 3, implied into every mortgage unless negatived 
by the PLA 1952, s 78. 
251 Rating Powers Act 1988, s 139(1). Although they can reclaim these expenditures from the 
mortgagor, see Rating Powers Act 1988, s 139(4). See also PLA 1952, Fourth Schedule, cl 7, 
implying this term into every mortgage unless negatived. 
252 Ratford v Northavon District Council [1986] 3 All ER 193, 208 (CA). See generally Hubert Picarda The 
Law Relating to Receivers, Managers and Administrators (2 ed, Butterworths, London, 1990) 182-184. 
253 Lord Trimleston v Hamill (1810) 1 Ball & B 377, 385 per the Irish Lord Chancellor. 
254 Metcalf v Campion (1828) 1 Mol 238, 239 per Lord Hart LC. 
255 Marshall v Cave (1824) 3 LJOS Ch 57 (ruinous state prevented beneficial occupation); Fyfe v Smith 
[1975] 2 NSWLR 408; White v City of London Brewery Co (1889) 42 Ch D 237 (CA) (no occupation 
rent was chargeable while the mortgaged pub's depressed state precluded rental). 
256 Waitemata Electric Power Board v Mills [1971] NZLR 630 (SC). 
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conduct lest they be deemed a shadow director,257 attracting the duties, obligations, and 
potential fines inflicted upon directors by the Companies Act 1993.258 
E How Do the Differences in Liabilities Affect the Choice of Remedy? 
The primary advantage of receivership, in terms of liabilities, is that it allows the 
mortgagee to shift the burden of liabilities onto a third party receiver. However, this 
benefit is tempered by the recent suggestion that a mortgagee cannot turn a blind eye to 
their receiver's misconduct, and in exceptional cases may be liable for failing to halt 
obvious injustice.259  
Additionally, whereas previously mortgagors were liable for their existing contracts 
plus new contracts made by receivers,260 under the Receiverships Act 1993 receivers are 
personally liable for new contracts, rent, wages, and hiring fees. Therefore third parties' 
claims against the mortgagor, which once ranked as unsecured debts to be satisfied from 
the mortgaged property only after the mortgagee had recouped their loan, are now paid by 
receivers, who in turn, due to their implied indemnity for personal liability, take these 
sums from the mortgaged assets in prioirty to the mortgagee's claim.261 A receiver's 
equitable lien (arising from their indemnity) even permits them to retain possession of the 
mortgaged property until their claim is realised, since " equity will never take [charged 
property] out of the hands of a [receiver] without seeing that … he is relieved from 
personal liability in respect of them ."262 Thus the Receiverships Act 1993, by indirectly 
allowing wages, rents, fees and other contractual expenses to be paid out of the mortgaged 
property ahead of the mortgagee's loan, increases the risk that the mortgagee's security 
will be insufficient. This is another example of how recent changes to the law have 
undermined the traditional advantages of receivership.  
Nevertheless, possession still yields a potentially wider range of personal liabilities 
than does receivership: mortgagees in possession may have to pay rates and occupation 
rent, may inherit the mortgagor's obligations under leasehold covenants (such as repair), 
  
257 "Director" includes someone who controls the exercise of the Board's powers: Companies Act 
1993, s 126(1)(b).  
258 See generally James O'Donovan "Banks as Shadow Directors" (1995) 25 VUWLR 285. 
259 See above subsection VII C: Liability For Breach of Duty. 
260 D Owen & Co v Cronk [1895] 1 QB 265 (CA). 
261 Moodemere Pty Ltd v Waters (1988) 5 ACLC 790 (Vic:SC). 
262 Jennings v Mather [1902] 1 KB 1, 6 per Stirling LJ (CA). See also Mellor v Mellor [1992] 4 All ER 10, 
20 per Hart QC; Hill v Venning (1979) 4 ACLR 555 (Qld:SC). But the indemnity only relates to 
established, not contingent, debts: Dyson v Peat [1917] 1 Ch 99.  
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may acquire the full responsibilities of being an "employer", and are more easily found 
guilty of inducing breaches of contract. As the total dollar value of these personal liabilities 
increases, so does the possibility that the mortgaged property will be insufficient to cover 
them, causing direct loss for even fully-indemnified mortgagees. 
Ultimately, in terms of liability, receivership continues to be the more attractive option 
as prima facie liability for expenditure is shifted to a third party, and the additional 
personal liabilities associated with possession are avoided. But this subsection, and 
indeed, the whole article, has hopefully shown that the advantages of receivership have 
been greatly diluted. 
VIII CONCLUSIONS 
A primary goal of this article was to re-evaluate the institutionalised mantra that 
receivership is the superior remedy to possession. The inescapable conclusion is that the 
recent changes to New Zealand law, and in particular the Receiverships Act 1993, eroded 
the pillars upon which that mantra stood. Today, receivers operate under duties which 
restrict the range of uses to which they can put mortgaged property, curtailing their 
freedom in a manner similar to that experienced by mortgagees in possession through 
their liability for wilful default. The imposition of personal liability upon receivers has, 
through the operation of their agent's indemnity, increased the risk that a mortgagee will 
see the value of their security whittled away by what were previously unsecured, inferior 
debts. There is also judicial dicta that mortgagees may sometimes be responsible for their 
receivers' misconduct, further dispelling the idea that by opting for receivership 
mortgagees wash their hands of potential liability. 
This article has also drawn attention to the particular circumstances in which entry into 
possession may be preferable in light of the remedy's attendant rights and powers, such as 
the power to run the mortgagor's business, demand vacant possession, and repudiate 
certain contracts. Additionally, considerations arising from the disparate laws relating to 
the initiation of each remedy may also, depending on the facts, make receivership 
impractical or impossible to invoke. With the erosion of the some of the traditional 
advantages of receivership, these considerations may play a greater role in determining a 
mortgagee's choice of remedy. 
Secondly, this article has highlighted the fascinating battle between competing 
equitable considerations that has shaped mortgage law. Through Downsview and Medforth, 
the balancing process continues, and while of limited relevance in New Zealand, the future 
reconciliation of these two cases may yet impact upon the duties, and thus conduct, of 
mortgagees. 
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Finally, given the simultaneous review of the laws of mortgagee possession and 
receivership, and the obvious attempts to apply similar rules to both263 (particularly in 
terms of regulatory provisions), it is disappointing that this article has revealed several 
unjustifiable inconsistencies. Differences in entitlement, notification requirements, 
reporting requirements, personal qualifications, rights to essential services, and the 
availability of judicial controls have all been identified as requiring rectification. These 
differences, in addition to the aforementioned effect the Receiverships Act 1993 has had on 
a mortgagee's choice of remedy, plus that Act's failure to distinguish between corporate 
and non-corporate receiverships, leads to the suspicion that this legislation was introduced 
without thoroughly analysing its consistency with other laws and its effect upon 
mortgagee practice. Perhaps the mantra of receivership's superiority is to blame: by 
characterising mortgage possession as inferior, the laws of mortgagee possession slipped 
into relative obscurity and possibly, to the drafters of the Receiverships Act 1993, 
unimportance. Hopefully a greater appreciation of the historical connections between 
these bodies of law might remedy that type of thinking. 
 
 
263 Many of the provisions in the Part VIIA of the Property Law Act 1952 mirror word-for-word the 
provisions in the Receiverships Act 1993. 
